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Punitive in Effect: Reflections on
Canada v. Whaling
Hamish Stewart*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada decided only one case
concerning the constitutional aspects of punishment. In Canada (Attorney
General) v. Whaling,1 the Court held that the retrospective application of
the abolition of accelerated parole review offended the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms2 right against double punishment. The decision
did not touch on the constitutional merits of the abolition of accelerated
parole review itself and in that sense concerned a merely transitional issue
in sentencing and the administration of parole. It is nevertheless potentially
significant because it is the first time that the Supreme Court of Canada
has characterized a consequence of the commission of an offence as
“punishment” based solely on its effect rather than on its purpose. It may
therefore open up to Charter scrutiny a wide range of policy changes
concerning the treatment of offenders.

II. CHARTER RIGHTS RELATING TO PUNISHMENT
The Charter provides (at least) four rights relating to punishment.
First, section 12 provides that “Everyone has the right not to be subjected
to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.” The Supreme Court
of Canada has consistently held that to demonstrate a violation of section 12
with respect to “punishment”, a Charter applicant must show that the
punishment for the offence is “grossly disproportionate” in the sense that

*
Faculty of law, University of Toronto. I am very grateful to an anonymous reviewer for
comments on a draft and to Manasvin Goswami for research assistance.
1
[2014] S.C.J. No. 20, 2014 SCC 20, [2014] 1 S.C.R 392 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Whaling”].
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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it is “...so excessive as to outrage standards of decency”.3 That is a high
standard and is difficult for a Charter applicant to show.
Section 11 contains two rights concerning punishment. Section 11(h)
provides, as part of the more general guarantee against double jeopardy,
that a person charged with an offence has the right “...if finally found
guilty and punished for the offence, not to be … punished for it again”.
Section 11(i) provides that where the penalty for an offence has been varied
between the time the offence was committed and the time of sentencing, the
offender has the right “to the benefit of the lesser punishment”.
Finally, since an offender’s liberty under section 7 of the Charter is
at stake in sentencing proceedings and in the conditions under which his
or her sentence is served, he or she is entitled to the protection of the
principles of fundamental justice throughout the process of being sentenced
and of serving his or her sentence. Substantive principles of fundamental
justice relevant to punishment, not expressly stated elsewhere in the
Charter, arguably include a partial constitutionalization of the Kienapple
rule4 against multiple convictions for the same wrong5 and the requirement
that in the sentencing hearing the Crown prove contested aggravating
factors beyond a reasonable doubt.6
The section 11 rights concerning punishment are only triggered if an
offender is “punished”. If the state does something to an offender that is
not “punishment”, then they do not apply. The section 12 guarantee
against cruel and unusual “treatment” would apply, as would the section 7
principles of fundamental justice, to the extent that the state’s action
affected the offender’s interest in liberty or security of the person. But
the two punishment-related rights in section 11 do not apply unless the
consequence of a finding of guilt is “punishment” for Charter purposes.
In R. v. Wigglesworth,7 which concerned the relationship between a
criminal charge and a police service offence, the Court defined
“punishment” as follows: A consequence for an individual was
“punishment” if it was imposed in proceedings of a criminal or quasicriminal nature, or, regardless of the nature of the proceedings, if it was
“a true penal consequence” such as “imprisonment or a fine which by its
magnitude would appear to be imposed for the purpose of redressing the
3

R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at 1072 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Kienapple, [1974] S.C.J. No. 76, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729 (S.C.C.).
5
On this possibility, see most recently, R. v. Meszaros, [2013] O.J. No. 5113, 2013 ONCA
682, at paras. 62-68 (Ont. C.A.).
6
R. v. D.B., [2008] S.C.J. No. 25, 2008 SCC 25, at para. 78 (S.C.C.).
7
[1987] S.C.J. No. 71, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wigglesworth”].
4
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wrong done to society at large rather than for the maintenance of internal
discipline” within a regulated area of conduct.8 On that test, a sanction
imposed on an RCMP officer for a service offence did not preclude
criminal punishment following a subsequent prosecution based on the
same conduct. The first sanction was not “punishment” in the Charter
sense. In R. v. Rodgers, where the issue was the nature of the consequence
rather than the nature of the proceedings, the Court held that a
consequence amounted to “punishment” if it satisfied this two-part
test: “…the consequence will constitute a punishment when [1] it forms
part of the arsenal of sanctions to which an accused may be liable in
respect of a particular offence and [2] the sanction is one imposed in
furtherance of the purpose and principles of sentencing”.9 The Court held
that the requirement that a convicted offender provide a bodily sample
for forensic DNA analysis was not part of the “arsenal of sanctions”; it
was more akin to taking fingerprints or photographs of a suspect.10 The
law authorizing the taking of such samples from previously convicted
offenders therefore did not violate section 11(h) of the Charter.
The picture that emerges from these early cases is that a consequence
is likely to be characterized as punishment for Charter purposes if it has a
punitive purpose, that is, a purpose of “redressing wrongs done to society
at large”.11 A traditional consequence such as imprisonment, probation,
or a fine will almost certainly be so characterized, but non-traditional
consequences will not be unless they can be shown to have a punitive
purpose.

III. WHALING AND THE MEANING OF “PUNISHMENT”
In 2011, Parliament enacted the Abolition of Early Parole Act
(“AEPA”),12 amending the Corrections and Conditional Release Act,13 to
eliminate the possibility of “accelerated parole review”. The application
of the AEPA was expressly retrospective: section 10(2) provided that
offenders who had already been sentenced would not be eligible for
8

Id., at 400-402.
[2006] S.C.J. No. 15, 2006 SCC 15 at para. 63 (S.C.C.) [numbering added; hereinafter
“Rodgers”].
10
Id., at para. 65.
11
R. v. Shubley, [1990] S.C.J. No. 1, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 3, at 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Shubley”],
and compare at 20.
12
S.C. 2011, c. 11.
13
S.C. 1992, c. 20.
9
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accelerated parole review. The applicants in Whaling were three
offenders who were already serving federal sentences when the AEPA
came into force and whose eligibility for parole had as a result been
delayed: in the case of the applicant Maidana, by 21 months. They argued
that the retroactive application of AEPA violated their section 11(h) right
not to be punished again for their offences. But that right would apply
only if delaying their eligibility for parole was a form of “punishment”
for Charter purposes.
The claim that variations in parole eligibility are forms of
“punishment” is not an easy one to make. An offender who is on parole is
still serving the sentence originally imposed following conviction. He or
she is liable to have parole revoked on various grounds. So it might be
argued that changing the timing of or conditions for parole eligibility is
not additional “punishment” (though it would be subject to scrutiny
under section 7 since it would affect the offender’s liberty interest14). It is
merely a change in the way the sentence is served.
The Government’s argument that the abolition of accelerated parole
was not “punishment” was not quite so straightforward as that. The
Government argued, first, that because the delay in parole ineligibility
was not imposed following a new proceeding, it did not count as
“punishment” on the Wigglesworth approach.15 The Court rightly
rejected this submission. As Wagner J. points out, it would be very odd
indeed if it was constitutionally easier for the state “to punish someone
without a proceeding than to punish him or her with a proceeding”.16 If
14
A change in the parole regime was subject to Charter challenge in Cunningham v.
Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 47, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.). The Court recognized that the change
implicated an offender’s liberty interest, but dismissed the challenge on other grounds. In Whaling,
the Court found it unnecessary to decide the applicants’ s. 7 claim: Whaling, supra, note 1, at
paras. 75-76. A change in parole regimes would also be subject to scrutiny under the Charter
requirement that detention not be arbitrary (s. 9) and the common law requirement that detention be
lawful (Mission Institution v. Khela, [2014] S.C.J. No. 24, 2014 SCC 24 (S.C.C.); May v. Ferndale
Institution, [2005] S.C.J. No. 84, 2005 SCC 82 (S.C.C.)). State action in compliance with the statute
would satisfy the common law requirement; the question whether the statute itself was “arbitrary”
for s. 9 purposes would overlap with the s. 7 question of whether it complied with the principles of
fundamental justice.
15
A slightly different version of this argument had already been considered and rejected in
Rodgers. A peace officer’s application for an order requiring previously convicted offenders provide
a bodily sample for forensic DNA analysis was not a proceeding in which the offender was, in the
opening words of s. 11, “charged with an offence”. The Court held the s. 11(h) guarantee against
double punishment would nevertheless apply because the consequence flowed from the original
conviction. Rodgers, supra, note 9, at para. 58. Any other reading would make the s. 11(h) guarantee
virtually meaningless. (The Court went on to hold that the consequence was not “punishment”.)
16
Whaling, supra, note 1, at para. 38.
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the Government’s interpretation of section 11(h) was correct, not only
would the retroactive application of AEPA not violate double jeopardy,
neither would a statute that automatically added a year of imprisonment
to the sentences of all previously convicted offenders or that gave the
Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada a discretion to
continue the detention of any offenders after the expiration of their
sentences. Such a law would be subject to challenge under sections 7 and
12 of the Charter — but it would not be a form of double punishment.
That would be a very implausible conclusion.
The Government’s second argument was much stronger. It was,
simply, that a delay in parole eligibility was not punishment on the
Rodgers definition. The Court essentially accepted that argument. With
some hesitation, the Court agreed with the Government’s submission that
the purpose of retroactively applying the AEPA was not to pursue the
traditional sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence by
punishing offenders who were already serving sentences but merely to
achieve uniformity in the application of the legitimate policy objective of
abolishing early parole.17 Thus, the abolition of early parole eligibility
was “neither a second proceeding nor a ‘sanction’ in the sense contemplated
in Rodgers”.18
One would expect the constitutional challenge to fail at this point.
But the Court avoided that conclusion by expanding its conception of
punishment. Evidently troubled by what was functionally an increase in
the harshness of the sentences of previously convicted offenders, the
Court held that the Rodgers test was concerned with the characterization
of “a discrete sanction — one that does not modify the original sanction”;
but the issue here was how to characterize a modification of an existing
sanction.19 Abolition of early parole eligibility created a situation where
“from a functional rather than a formalistic perspective, the harshness of
punishment has been increased”.20 As usual, it is not clear what the Court
means by contrasting the formal (bad) with the functional (good), but the
Court was evidently concerned to recognize the constitutional significance
of the increase in the proportion of their sentence that previously
convicted offenders would serve in the penitentiary rather than on parole.
So, for the purposes of applying the section 11(h) right against double
17
18
19
20

Whaling, id., at para. 68.
Id., at para. 49.
Id., at para. 52.
Id., at para. 52.
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punishment, “punishment” now means any of the following three “state
actions in relation to the same offence”:
(a) a proceeding that is criminal or quasi-criminal in nature …;
(b) an additional sanction or consequence that meets the two-part
Rodgers test for punishment … in that it is similar in nature to the
types of sanctions available under the Criminal Code and is imposed
in furtherance of the purpose and principles of sentencing; and
(c) retrospective changes to the conditions of the original sanction
which have the effect of adding to the offender’s punishment….21

Not every effect on an existing sentence will constitute “punishment”
for this purpose. Though the Court was reluctant to define exactly what
effect would count, the basic idea was that a law having a sufficiently
significant impact on “an offender’s settled expectation of liberty” would
constitute fresh punishment and would therefore violate section 11(h).22
Applying this idea to the AEPA, the Court found that although
Parliament’s purpose in abolishing accelerated parole review was not
punitive, the abolition was punitive in effect. It was “a lengthening of the
minimum period of incarceration for persons … who would have qualified
for early day parole under the APR system”; it was imposed
“automatical[ly] and without regard to individual circumstances”.23 It was
therefore “double punishment” and offended section 11(h) of the Charter.24
The Court found that the violation of section 11(h) was not justified
under section 1. At the first stage of the Oakes test25 for justifying a limit
on a Charter right, the state must show that the limit has a pressing and
substantial objective. The Court agreed with the trial judge’s finding that
that the objective of the AEPA in general, and of its retrospective
application in particular,26 was pressing and substantial: “ensuring that
sentences as administered are consistent with the sentences courts
impose, which, by extension, includes maintaining or restoring public

21

Id., at para. 54.
Id., at para. 60.
23
Id., at paras. 70-71.
24
Id., at para. 72.
25
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
26
Thus, the Court avoided the frequent error of considering the objective of the legislation
in general, rather than the objective of the limit on the Charter right, to be pressing and substantial. It
happens in this case that these two objectives are the same, but while the former provides essential
context for determining the latter, they are not always identical, and it is the limit on the right, not
the legislation in general, that must be justified under s. 1.
22
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confidence in the administration of justice”.27 However, the Court found
that the retrospective application of the AEPA was not proportional
because it was not minimally impairing: the Government had not shown
that prospective application only “would have significantly undermined
[Parliament’s] objectives”.28 In other words, Parliament had open to it the
less rights-impairing alternative of not violating the section 11(h) right at
all. Although expressed as a lack of minimal impairment, this amounts to
saying that the rights infringement was not necessary to Parliament’s
objective and so not proportional because not rationally connected.

IV. IMPLICATIONS
Whaling is the first case where the Supreme Court of Canada has
found that a consequence of conviction amounts to “punishment” for
Charter purposes solely because of its effects rather than because of its
purposes. While the Court has on occasion considered the magnitude of a
consequence, and thus its effect on the offender, as a factor in
determining the legislature’s purpose,29 it has never previously held that a
consequence, though not punitive in its purpose, was punishment
because it was punitive in its effect. While the reasoning in Whaling is
specifically limited to the context of a new consequence imposed on
offenders already serving their sentences, and moreover to section 11(h),
this new willingness to consider effect as well as purpose could have a
number of implications for constitutional review of newly invented
consequences of conviction.
Consider, for example, the question whether a victim surcharge
imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code30 is “punishment” for
the purpose of section 7, 11, or 12 of the Charter. Section 737(1) provides
that a person who is convicted or discharged “shall pay a victim surcharge,
in addition to any other punishments imposed”. Section 737(2)(a) provides
that the surcharge is 30 per cent of any fine imposed; if no fine is
imposed, section 737(2)(b) provides that the surcharge is $100 for a

27

Whaling, supra, note 1, at para. 78.
Id., at para. 80.
29
In Shubley, supra, note 11, at 23, for example, the Court commented that the penalties
imposed in a prison discipline proceeding were “entirely commensurate with the goal of fostering
internal prison discipline and … not of a magnitude or consequence that would be expected for
redressing wrongs done to society at large”.
30
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter “Criminal Code”].
28
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summary conviction offence and $200 for an offence punishable by
indictment. Courts in Ontario have reached different conclusions on the
question whether this surcharge is “punishment”. In his impressively
reasoned and sensitively written decision in Michael,31 Paciocco J. of the
Ontario Court of Justice concluded that a victim surcharge was not only
punishment but was cruel and unusual punishment under section 12.32
Justice Paciocco’s reasoning on the first point was straightforward: the
victim surcharge satisfied both elements of the Rodgers test. The victim
surcharge was, in essence, a fine and therefore part of the traditional
arsenal of sanctions. Section 737(1) referred to it as being imposed “in
addition to any other punishment”, suggesting that it is indeed a
punishment. Moreover, Paciocco J. noted that “only offenders pay the
victim surcharge and they do so as part of the sentencing process” and
that the victim surcharge fell within the definition of a “fine” in section 716,
that is “a pecuniary penalty or other sum of money, but … not …
restitution.”33 As for the Crown’s submission that the victim surcharge
was indeed a type of restitution and therefore not a fine, he noted that the
surcharge did not appear in the Code sections concerning restitution. The
surcharge went into a fund which was used “for the purposes of
providing … assistance to the victims of offences” (section 737(7)), not
restitution to particular victims, let alone the offender’s victims;
moreover, it was unrelated to the loss caused.34 Rather, it was imposed
“to make offenders pay for their crimes”, not to the specific victim, but to
society in general.35 He then went on to hold that the surcharge was cruel
and unusual because it was grossly disproportionate on the facts of a
reasonable hypothetical: the facts of the very case before him, slightly
adjusted.36 The offender was liable to a victim surcharge of $900. He was
31
R. v. Michael, [2014] O.J. No. 3609, 2014 ONCJ 360, 314 C.C.C. (3d) 180 (Ont. C.J.)
[hereinafter “Michael”].
32
Section 737(5), which provided for an exemption on the application of the offender if the
victim surcharge would cause “undue hardship” to the offender or his/her dependants, was repealed
in 2013. If this discretion was still available, it would likely be a complete answer to the claim that
the victim surcharge was cruel and unusual.
33
Id., at paras. 8 and 11.
34
Id., at para. 13.
35
Id., at para. 8.
36
On the facts of the case, Paciocco J. could have avoided imposing the victim surcharge of
$900 by imposing a nominal fine (e.g., $1.00) for each offence; according to s. 737(2)(a), the
surcharge would be 15 per cent of that fine, for a total of $10.35. It is questionable whether this
device is consistent with the policy behind the repeal of s. 737(5). But it is in any event not available
where the offender cannot be fined: in those cases, the offender must pay the minimum victim
surcharge of $50 or $100, as the case may be, laid out in s. 737(2)(b). For example, an offender
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a drug- and alcohol-addicted repeat offender who had no prospect of ever
paying it. The impact on his life of the lingering effect of an unpaid
victim surcharge was grossly disproportionate to the relatively minor
offence of which he had been convicted.37
In contrast, in R. v. Tinker, Glass J. of the Superior Court of Justice
of Ontario held, for section 7 purposes, that the victim surcharge was not
a fine:
I do not read a surcharge to be a fine. It is not in the form of a penalty. It
flows from a conviction for a crime, but it is not a sanction in its own
right. Rather, it is … a sum of money established to be a consequence of
breaking the law. That is different from a sanction because is it not in the
same category as a fine, a tax, or a penalty. Rather, the surcharge is a sum
of money that goes into a pool of resources to help victims of crime.38

Both of these interpretations of the victim surcharge are possible;
neither depends on any assessment of the effects of the victim surcharge
on the offender. Justice Paciocco’s is preferable, because of the wording
of section 737(1), the close analogy between the surcharge and a fine,
and the weak link between the surcharge and any restitutionary purpose.
But if, in light of Whaling, it is permissible to consider the effect of a
consequence as well as its purpose in determining whether the
consequence is “punishment” for Charter purposes, then the case for
characterizing the victim surcharge as a punishment is even stronger. In
Michael, the offender was extremely impoverished and had no hope of
ever paying the $900 victim surcharge to which he was liable. The
prospect of harassment by collection agencies and imprisonment for nonpayment would hang over him indefinitely and he would never be able to
apply for a record suspension; he would, in effect, never be able to repay
his debt to society for the relatively minor offences of which he had been
found guilty.39 Justice Paciocco made these observations in assessing
whether the victim surcharge was cruel and unusual for Charter

cannot be fined where he or she is discharged rather than convicted because only a convicted
offender can be fined (ss. 731, 734); and an offender cannot be fined where he or she is sentenced to
imprisonment followed by probation (at least, that is how the predecessor of s. 731(1)(b) has been
interpreted in Ontario and Quebec: R. v. Blacquierre, [1975] O.J. No. 443, 24 C.C.C. (2d) 168 (Ont.
C.A.); R. c. St. James, [1981] J.Q. no 163, 20 C.R. (3d) 389 (Que. C.A.)). So, the reasonable
hypothetical consisted of the facts of Michael’s case on the assumption that he was an offender who
could not be fined.
37
Michael, supra, note 31, at paras. 58-81.
38
[2015] O.J. No. 1758, 2015 ONSC 2284, at para. 29 (Ont. S.C.J.).
39
Michael, supra, note 31, at paras. 70-88.
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purposes; but after Whaling, they may be equally relevant to the question
whether the surcharge is punishment in the first place. Moreover, as he
says at the outset of his reasons for judgment:
[Whaling holds that] a provision that increases the period of
incarceration to be served is necessarily a punishment. The same holds
true … for a provision like s. 737, which enhances the amount of any
fine that must be paid. How can a fine be a paradigmatic example of a
punishment, yet a provision adding 30% to the amount of a fine, not be
a punishment?40

While Paciocco J. may have overstated the ratio of Whaling, his
analogy between the effective length of the period of imprisonment and
the effective size of the fine is nevertheless compelling.
Second, consider whether the registration requirement for sexual
offenders is a form of punishment. Canadian courts have almost uniformly
ruled that it is not. The purpose of the registration requirement is said to be
facilitating the investigation of crime rather than punishing the offender.41
That is probably right as far as it goes. But registration has a very
significant effect on an offender’s liberty: for a minimum of 10 years and
in some cases for life, the offender must register annually, provide
considerable personal information, report any change within seven days,
and report every anticipated absence of more than seven days from his
residence.42 Failure to comply with these obligations is an offence
punishable by imprisonment.43 The impact of the registration requirement
on liberty is relevant not only for the purpose of engaging section 7 of the
Charter,44 but also for the comparison with consequences that undoubtedly
do constitute punishment: imprisonment and probation. Moreover, these
registration obligations are imposed only on those who commit sexual
offences and on no one else. To the extent that effect as well as purpose is

40

Michael, id., at para. 5. This thought is, however, not strictly speaking part of the ratio of
the decision.
41
See, for example, R. v. B. (C.L.) [R. v. C.L.B.], [2010] A.J. No. 451, 253 C.C.C. (3d) 486
(Alta. C.A.); R. v. C. (S.S.) [R. v. S.S.C.], [2008] B.C.J. No. 1148, 234 C.C.C. (3d) 365 (B.C.C.A.);
R. v. Cross, [2006] N.S.J. No. 87, 205 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (N.S.C.A.).
42
Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10, ss. 4-6.
43
Criminal Code, supra, note 30, at ss. 490.031, 490.0311, 490.0312.
44
Any restriction on conduct punishable by imprisonment engages the s. 7 liberty interest:
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
486 (S.C.C.). As for the registration requirements themselves — as opposed to punishment for
failing to comply with them — it might be arguable that they touch on the basic liberty interest to
move around Canada: compare R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.).
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relevant to the characterization, the case for characterizing sexual offender
registration as punishment is strong.
Third, consider the intriguing question raised in Guindon v. Canada.45
In that case, pursuant to section 163.2 of the Income Tax Act,46 the
Canada Revenue Agency assessed a penalty of $565,000 against the
taxpayer, a lawyer who had vouched for a fraudulent charitable scheme.
In proceedings to challenge the assessment, the taxpayer argued that she
was “charged with an offence” so as to engage her rights under section 11
of the Charter, in particular the presumption of innocence. The Tax Court
of Canada held that she was indeed charged with an offence. The Federal
Court of Appeal set this holding aside on procedural grounds. In the
alternative, the Court of Appeal held that the taxpayer was not charged
with an offence because (among other considerations) penalties imposed
under the Income Tax Act were “not about condemning morally
blameworthy conduct or inviting societal condemnation of the conduct …
[but] about ensuring that this discrete regulatory and administrative field of
endeavour works properly”.47 This reasoning relies on the pre-Whaling
distinction between punishments and other consequences, but is applied
here to help determine the nature of the proceedings faced by the taxpayer.
To the extent that Whaling licenses courts to consider the effects as well as
the purposes of state action in characterizing the nature of a consequence,
it certainly seemed to strengthen the taxpayer’s case. The more the
$565,000 assessment looks like punishment in the form of a fine for the
taxpayer’s alleged wilful disregard for the requirements of the Income Tax
Act, the more likely the proceedings that lead to its imposition would be
subject to the procedural rights in section 11 of the Charter. In the end, the
Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision in
Guindon without reference to Whaling, but Whaling nevertheless
strengthens any argument that seeks to characterize a consequence as penal
based on its effect as well as its purpose.
Finally, Whaling has been invoked to support the submission that
changes in the legislative treatment of pre-trial custody are punitive, once
again because of their effect rather than because of their purpose. The
Truth in Sentencing Act48 imposed an upper limit of 1.5:1 on an offender’s

45
[2013] F.C.J. No. 673, 2013 FCA 153 (Fed. C.A.) [hereinafter “Guindon”], affd [2015]
S.C.J. No. 41, 2015 SCC 41 (S.C.C.).
46
R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.).
47
Guindon, supra, note 45, at para. 41, citing Wigglesworth in support of this point.
48
S.C. 2009, c. 29.
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credit for pre-trial custody. Prior to that Act, it was common for
offenders to receive 2:1 credit, or sometimes even more depending on the
conditions of their pre-trial detention. In R.S., without any real
consideration of the purpose of the Truth in Sentencing Act, the Ontario
Court of Appeal held that it effectively imposed greater punishment on
offenders.49 Its application to offenders who committed their offences
before it came into force was therefore inconsistent with the right to the
“benefit of the lesser punishment” under section 11(i) of the Charter.50

V. CONCLUSION
The earliest Charter cases established, as a general rule, that Charter
rights could be engaged either by state conduct that was intended to
violate them or, much more commonly, by state conduct that affected the
interests that they protected. The right to freedom of religion in
section 2(a) of the Charter is engaged by legislation that affects the
exercise of religion;51 the right to freedom of expression in section 2(b) is
engaged by legislation that affects expression;52 the right to liberty in
section 7 of the Charter is engaged by state conduct that results in
detention.53 In none of these scenarios is it necessary for the Charter
applicant to show that the state intended to affect or to limit the relevant
Charter rights (though that would be sufficient). But, for reasons that are
unclear, the Court has been reluctant to take the same approach to the
section 11 rights concerning punishment. Consequences of conviction
that do not have a punitive purpose have generally been exempt from
scrutiny under section 11(h) or (i) of the Charter.
This reluctance reached an illogical extreme in Rodgers. The issue
there was whether the requirement that convicted or discharged offenders
provide a bodily sample for forensic DNA analysis was a form of
“punishment”. It was not, apparently because it had a non-punitive

49

R. v. S. (R.), [2015] O.J. No. 2183, at paras. 30-31 (Ont. C.A.).
In Liang v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] B.C.J. No. 962, 2014 BCCA 190, 311
C.C.C. (3d) 159 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 298 (S.C.C.), the British
Columbia Court of Appeal held that the AEPA offended s. 11(i). This result flows very
straightforwardly from Whaling.
51
R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.).
52
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927
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purpose; and, Charron J. added, no one would say that other laws with
deterrent effects or facilitating the investigation of crime, such as RIDE
spot checks or the taking of photographs or fingerprints, were forms of
punishment, even though, like imprisonment, they might well have a
deterrent effect.54 But the argument was not that every consequence
flowing from a law that deters crime or facilitates the investigation of
crime was punishment; the argument was rather that burdensome
consequences of findings of guilt were punishment. And law enforcement
measures such as RIDE spot checks and the taking of fingerprints are not
consequences of findings of guilt, whereas the requirement to provide a
bodily sample is a consequence of such a finding.
While the precise scope of Whaling is far from clear, the decision turns
on a very welcome recognition that the consequences of a conviction can
be construed as punishment not only because of their punitive purposes
but also because of their burdensome effects. This does not, of course,
mean that every newly invented consequence of conviction will be
characterized as punishment. But it does mean that those consequences can
be scrutinized for compliance with the basic principles of prospectivity and
proportionality enshrined in sections 11 and 12 of the Charter.
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